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Philip Sidney’s Apology for Poetry defends the capacity of poetry to teach truth whether 
it is prophecy or fiction.  Sidney associates fiction with prophecy to elevate fiction and 
show that it reveals truth even if it isn’t true.  While John Milton intertwines fiction and 
prophecy to emphasize the didactic quality of Paradise Lost, Milton’s contemporary, 
Thomas Traherne, defends the ability of fiction to teach readers while treating fiction as 
such in his Centuries of Meditations and Poems of Felicity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
My thesis identifies some of the different ways in which prophetic and fictional 
poetry could be understood as tools for human empowerment and enlightenment in 
early modern England.  Poetry, whether prophetic or fictional, empowers people 
because it gives them freedom to explore and experience something beyond the world 
they know.  The difference between understanding poetry as prophecy and 
understanding it as fiction is in the amount of freedom granted to the human mind to 
depart from reality and create alternative worlds on its own.  Philip Sidney’s late 
sixteenth-century text, Apology for Poetry, contains theories for poetry and fiction-
making which are valuable for understanding differing conceptions of prophetic and 
fictional poetic creation in the late seventeenth century.  Sidney invests power in poetic 
creation by comparing it to divine creation, but he distinguishes between prophetic 
poets who “imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God,” and “right poets” who, 
“having no law but wit, […] to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall 
be” (102-3).  The prophetic poet retrieves divine knowledge from an external source, 
while the poet of fiction works autonomously. 
Sidney’s ideas about poetry echo through the poems of John Milton and Thomas 
Traherne, particularly those which regenerate the lost Christian paradise, a vein of 
poetry that strongly asserts the power of the poet to prophetically convey or to create 
new worlds.  John Milton’s Paradise Lost and Thomas Traherne’s Poems of Felicity 
and Centuries of Meditations are early modern texts that work to generate the 
experience of a paradise that is otherwise inaccessible to their readers.  Both Milton and 
Traherne take on this heavy task of recovering paradise through poetry, but while 
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Milton portrays the poet as someone with prophetic knowledge who can reveal an 
otherwise inaccessible paradise to his readers, Traherne argues that everyone can come 
to see the world around them as paradise by exercising their own creativity through 
experiments with fiction. While Milton and Traherne agree that reading and writing 
poetry can improve people mentally, emotionally and spiritually, they do not agree on 
the process by which the poet may conceive a new and ideal world, or the distribution 
of poetic ability among people. 
My project enters the study of poetic theory in Milton and Traherne by way of 
Philip Sidney’s Apology for Poetry because this text defends the value and usefulness of 
both prophetic and fictional poetry as forms of expression that can evoke change in 
people and their experiences of the world.  While there is a long history of claims for 
the didactic quality of poetry, Sidney’s Apology does make new claims about the 
process of human creativity.  As the first chapter will reveal, Sidney’s text introduces 
new meaning to the word ‘Idea’ in the English language, moving it away from its 
former Platonic meaning as an eternal form, and toward its modern meaning as a 
product of human thought.  “Idea” remains a key term in the writing of Milton and 
Traherne for conveying both human and divine creativity.  While these two poets would 
agree with the general precepts of Sidney’s Apology—that poetry teaches people things 
they can’t learn from the world around them and that it impacts people’s thoughts and 
actions in this world—the later poets each take different approaches to identifying the 
figure of the poet, the nature of poetic conception and the particular effects of poetic 
creativity.  This diversity of approaches to defining poetry shows that in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, the concept of creative thought and expression as a tool for 
7 
 
improving the human condition was rapidly evolving and was understood in a variety of 
ways. 
In a contemporary frame of thought, the practice of using poetry as a tool for 
regenerating the lost Christian paradise may not seem widely applicable.  However, the 
belief shared by Sidney, Milton and Traherne that poetry can restore such a lofty ideal 
points to the fact that people can benefit more generally by reading and writing 
literature.  In a modern world that values interdisciplinarity, it is important for people to 
be able to explain why literature is as valuable to society as, for example, law and 
medicine are.  This is not a new matter: Sidney’s Apology attests that in the past, 
literature has also required this kind of defense more readily than other fields of study.  
Perhaps some would agree that a defense of literature is just as necessary today as it was 
in Sidney’s time.  By analyzing the reverberation of Sidney’s Apology through the 
poetic imaginations of Milton and Traherne, my thesis demonstrates some of the 
various forms of empowerment that arise from the belief that people can use poetry to 
enact real and positive change in their selves and in the world. 
 
Chapter 2: Philip Sidney’s Apology for Poetry 
 In his Apology, Sidney defends poetry in general before he distinguishes 
between different kinds of poets and defends each of their approaches to poetic 
expression in different ways.  I argue that Sidney withholds from distinguishing 
between prophetic poets and poets of fiction, or “right poets” (102), until after he 
describes the poetic process in terms applicable to both because he wants to elevate the 
seriousness and usefulness of fiction in the mind of the reader by encouraging her to 
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associate fiction-making with prophecy.1  While Sidney praises prophetic poetry as a 
“noble” art with authority and long-standing tradition (102), he places more emphasis 
throughout the Apology on the need to defend fiction-making as a form of poetic 
expression that can teach moral values and improve upon an imperfect world.  I will 
show that Sidney artfully uses the authority and seriousness associated with prophecy to 
defend the value of fiction by comparing it to prophetic revelation.  At the same time, I 
will argue that Sidney believes fiction-making is more useful than prophecy because it 
gives the poet greater freedom and power to pursue his own interests. 
Sidney describes all poetry equally as an art that presents something through 
imitation.  He defines “imitation” as “a representing, counterfeiting, or figuring forth—
to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight” (101).  
Sidney believes that all poetry points to, or represents, something other than itself, not 
specifying whether this point of reference be something in the world, in the mind of 
God, or in the mind of the poet.  All poetry by his definition also aims to “teach and 
delight,” meaning that it is pleasurable and entertaining for the reader and that that it 
provides the reader with a lesson, or reveals something that the reader was not aware of 
before.  This passage describes the way the poetry works, but it does not yet specify 
whether the act of imitating is different for different kinds of poets. 
Just after describing poetry in general as imitation, Sidney divides poets into 
three groups defined by what those poets imitate: “vates,” or prophets, “imitate the 
inconceivable excellencies of God,” a second group of  poets “deal[s] with matters 
philosophical […] or natural, […] or historical,” and “right poets […] to imitate borrow 
                                                 
1 Sidney does not use the word “fiction,” but as I will argue, his definition of “right poets” places them in 
this category. 
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nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be” (Sidney 101-2).  Whereas the first two groups 
of poets receive the object of their imitation from another source, natural or divine, the 
third group writes fiction because they “borrow nothing,” but create the subject matter 
which their poems imitate.  Sidney refers to “vates” as “the first and most noble sort” 
while he dismisses poets who imitate history and nature, writing that “because this 
second sort […] takes not the course of his own invention, whether they properly be 
poets or not let grammarians dispute” (102).  Here, Sidney expresses his belief here that 
for a poet to earn his title, he must strive to make something new.  The label Sidney 
applies to the third category, “right poets,” the word “right” indicates that while these 
poets may not be as noble as prophetic poets, they are in Sidney’s mind most worthy of 
the title “poet.”  
Sidney believes that poets of fiction are more worthy of the title “poet,” than 
others who claim the same title because, as he observes earlier in the Apology, “poet” 
comes from the Greek “poiein,” or “to make” (Sidney 99).  Sidney discusses the 
etymology behind the English word for “poetry” before distinguishing between poets of 
prophecy, nature and fiction, so that he sees all of these poets as makers to some extent.  
However, he calls poets of fiction “right poets” to emphasize that they are more poetic, 
or more like makers than other kinds of poets.  After Sidney divides poets into three 
groups, he uses the word “poet” again, but with greater specificity of meaning to 
distinguish makers of fiction from prophets: “these third [group of poets] […] be they 
that, as the first and most noble sort may justly be termed vates, so these are waited on 
in the excellentest languages and best understandings, with the foredescribed name of 
poets” (102-3).  The title “poet” is flexible in Sidney’s Apology because in one sense, it 
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applies to any writer who partakes in the imitative art of “poesy,” while in another sense 
it refers only to those writers who are makers, or who create in their minds what they 
imitate through poetry. 
Scholars debate the firmness of Sidney’s division between “vates” and “right 
poets.”  Ronald Levao argues that this distinction is central to the Apology and that 
Sidney works to distinguish fiction-making from prophecy to develop “a poetic 
grounded entirely in the human mind” (224).  Roger Moore, in contrast, argues that 
“Sidney does not distinguish between prophetic and ‘right’ poetry as rigidly as his 
interpreters might like,” and that both types of poet access their art through divine 
inspiration, not fiction-making (37).  I agree with Levao’s reading because Sidney not 
only applies the different names, poets and “vates,” but he reveals his special interest in 
“right poets” later in the Apology when he defends poetry as fiction, especially when he 
claims that it “never affirmeth” its truth (Sidney 124).  Sidney’s defense of poetry as 
something that does not need to affirm itself as truth does not apply to prophecy which 
does affirm itself as true because it is a revelation of divine knowledge. 
Moore is correct, however, to observe that the distinction Sidney makes between 
prophets and “right poets” is not entirely clear.  In fact, it is purposefully unclear 
especially in the first five pages of the Apology.  Sidney does not, as Moore argues, 
trouble the distinction between prophecy and fiction to show that all poetry is divinely 
inspired; rather, Sidney defends prophecy as poetry in order to elevate the concept of 
poetry in general before defending fictional poetry as a morally useful art.  After 
discussing the Latin word for prophet, vates, as one of the former names for poets, 
Sidney retracts: “I fear me I seem to profane that holy name, applying it to Poetry, 
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which is among us thrown down to so ridiculous an estimation” (99).  Then he reasserts 
that, in fact, this should make the reader think twice about wanting to separate fiction 
from morality in the first place (99).  This is a key point in the Apology at which Sidney 
refers to prophecy as poetry to elevate poetry that is fictional and to make his readers 
take it seriously.  Sidney’s approach implies that it is harder for readers to dismiss and 
ridicule prophecy than it is for them to do so to fiction. 
One challenge to grasping Sidney’s distinction between prophets and makers of 
fiction in his Apology is in determining how his description of the poetic process 
leading up to his distinction between types of poets can apply differently to each type.  I 
argue that Sidney uses words to describe the poetic process which are flexible enough to 
mean something different for the prophetic poet than they would mean to the poet who 
writes fiction.  The two key words Sidney uses, which I will show he intends to mean 
different things for different poets, are “Idea” and “invention.”  Both of these words can 
either connote discovery and revelation, as they would when applied to the prophetic 
poet, or they can point to human intellectual creativity, as they would in the case of the 
poet who writes fiction. 
 For Sidney, the “Idea” describes the thought process the poet undergoes before 
writing his poem.  In the Apology, just after he describes the poet’s ability to discover or 
imagine things beyond nature, Sidney writes that “the skill of the artificer standeth in 
that Idea or fore-conceit of the work, and not in the work itself” (101).  Sidney says 
here that the surest sign of the poet’s talent, or “skill,” is not in the written poem, but in 
the thoughts behind the poem, in the mind of the poet.  Sidney evolves the term “Idea” 
away from its Platonic origin as an eternal form by equating it to “fore-conceit,” or the 
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plan which the poet conceives in his mind before writing his poem.  Sidney writes: “that 
the poet hath that Idea is manifest, by delivering them forth in such excellency as he 
hath imagined them” (Sidney 101).  The “excellency,” or value, of the poet’s art is not 
measured by its comparison to anything in the material world, or to a universal Platonic 
truth, but rather by comparison to an “Idea” that exists in the poet’s imagination.  This 
moves the source of poetry’s value away from the poem and toward the mind of the 
poet, but it doesn’t specify how the “Idea” came to be in the mind of the poet.  It 
remains in question whether the “Idea” is placed in the poet’s mind by another source, 
or if he creates it for himself. 
Sidney’s “Idea,” which he italicizes to mark as a foreign word, borrows from 
Platonic uses of the word and adds new meaning so that it can explain both the origin of 
a prophetic revelation and as the origin of fiction.  Erwin Panofsky’s study of the 
earliest uses of “Idea” explains the Platonic meaning from which the word originates.  
Plato used “Idea” to describe an unchanging and universally valid form which 
epitomized its corresponding objects under a standard of “cognitive truth” (Panofsky 4).  
For example, while there are many chairs in the world, Plato believed that there would 
be a single and eternally valid “Idea,” or form of a chair allowing everyone to recognize 
different chairs that exist in the material world and to represent them in art.  The 
Platonic Idea doesn’t give agency to the individual mind to create because the Idea is 
believed to precede the human thought by which it is conceived.  While Sidney’s use of 
the term carries Platonic connotations, especially in that the “Idea” does not exist in the 
material world before it is manifested in the poem, he changes its meaning so that it 
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either originates in the mind of the poet, or comes into the mind of the poet from a 
divine source beyond the existing world.2 
As much as Sidney’s use of “Idea” differs from Plato’s use, Sidney’s version of 
the word preserves part of its Platonic meaning in that it maintains that the “Idea” is not 
only absent from the world of objects, but also that it is ideal, or better than all existing 
objects.  Sidney notifies the reader of the superiority of the poetic “Idea” over nature, or 
the existing material world, when he writes that while nature’s “world is brazen, the 
poets deliver only a golden” (100).  The distinction between “brazen” and “golden” 
worlds comes from Ovid’s Metamorphoses and illustrates a contrast between a decline 
into corruption and deception, and a primal “golden” world of perfection (Shepherd 
156, 32f.).  Sidney associates this “golden” world with the poet’s “Idea” by describing 
the two in consecutive paragraphs and writing that the poet can “deliver” both (100-
101).  Even though Sidney does not use “Idea” in a strictly Platonic sense, the Platonic 
theory that Ideas are more perfect than objects enhances his argument that the poet 
delivers things that are better than what already exists in the world.  Once again, Sidney 
does not specify here whether the superior nature which the poet expresses is his own 
creation, or something created for him and transmitted to him as a prophecy. 
 Sidney is not the first person to revise Plato’s version of the Idea.  Erwin 
Panofsky begins his analysis of the evolution of the Idea into the sixteenth century with 
Plato’s contemporaries (16-18).  Plato did not associate the Idea with artistic creation; 
rather he believed that imitation of sensible objects further removed people from ideal 
                                                 
2 For an analysis of Plato’s influence on Sidney that does not mention Sidney’s use of the word “Idea,” 
see F. Michael Krouse, “Plato and Sidney’s Defense of Poesie,” Comparative Literature, 6.2 (1954): 138-
147. 
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forms, and that copying ideal forms did not qualify the artist as a creator because those 
forms preceded him and were unchanging (Panofsky 4-5).  Aristotle, rather, saw the 
Idea as a creative notion which could enter the world through the mind of the artist 
(Panofsky 16-17).  Panofsky writes that Cicero uses the Idea to describe a notion of 
perfection that is not bound to imitate reality, or to follow rigid norms of truth (13).  
Thus, Plato’s Idea quickly changes from a concept alien to the notion of intellectual 
creativity, to something that elevates intellectual and artistic creations above the 
existing world.  Still, in none of these examples is “Idea” used in the modern sense of 
an original thought. 
In addition to the long and complex history of meanings Panofsky finds attached 
to the word “Idea” in Greek and Latin, the OED reveals that Sidney’s use of “Idea” in 
the Apology brings new meaning to the word as part of the English language.  In the 
entry for “idea,” under the category of “[s]enses relating to or derived from the Platonic 
concept,” the OED distinguishes between “an abstract or eternally existing pattern or 
archetype of any kind of thing” (idea, 1.a), and “a conception of what is desirable or 
ought to be […] the plan or design according to which something is created or 
constructed” (idea, 2).  Sidney’s use of “Idea” in the Apology is the first cited use of the 
second meaning, which, unlike former uses in Engish, equates Idea to conception (idea, 
2).  Sidney is the first recorded writer in English who does not use the word to describe 
an eternally valid abstraction, but to describe thoughts which lead to artistic creations.  
This new use of the word places all of the focus of the poetic process within the poet’s 
mind, but it does not explicitly say whether the poet makes his own “plan or design,” or 
if he rather conveys the previously hidden design of another creator.   
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The flexibility of “Idea” allows Sidney to use the term to describe the process 
behind poetic creation before distinguishing fiction from prophecy so that it may apply 
variously to both.  The effect of using “Idea,” rather than a word like “thought,” allows 
Sidney to elevate the poetic process and assert that the concepts formed in the mind of 
the poet can achieve the quality of Platonic Ideas in their perfection and elevation above 
the world of existing objects.  The Platonic elevation of Idea over object provides 
precedent for Sidney’s association of the poet’s “Idea” with the primal “golden” world 
which exists separately from the “brazen world” he believes people live in (100). 
Any analysis of Sidney’s “Idea” must account for the fact that Sidney applies it 
both to “vates” and to “right poets,” to whom he does not apply the same kind of 
creativity.  Ronald Levao fails to do this when cites Sidney’s use of “Idea” as evidence 
for his argument that Sidney’s idea of poetry seeks freedom from the need for divine 
inspiration (Levao 224).  Levao also refers to the part of the Apology in which Sidney 
writes that the poet is “lifted up by the vigor of his own invention” (Levao 224, Sidney 
100).  However, Sidney uses both “Idea” and “invention” before he distinguishes 
between “vates” and “right poets” and the word “invention” is as ambiguous as “Idea” 
in its ability to apply to both kinds of poetry.  The OED reveals that in Sidney’s time, 
“invention” could mean either “the action of coming upon or finding” (1.a), or “the 
action of devising, contriving or making up” (2).  The first use of the word applies to 
prophetic poetry in which the poet can find out formerly hidden divine truths, while the 
second use of the word applies to fictional poetry in which the poet creates new things.  
Levao’s analysis of Sidney’s theory for poetry is useful for understanding the creative 
power of “right poets” (Sidney 102), but he fails to acknowledge that both “Idea” and 
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“invention” are flexible enough to take on different meanings when applied to “vates” 
and to “right poets,” a distinction Sidney does not make until after he uses the terms 
“Idea” and “invention” to describe the process behind poetry. 
Sidney distinguishes between prophetic poets and “right poets” after he uses the 
terms “Idea” and “invention,” suggesting that these words are not necessarily indicative 
of human creativity.  The question remains of whether the “Idea” is placed in the mind 
of the poet by a heavenly agent, such as Milton’s muse for example, or formed within 
the mind by the poet.  The “Idea” applies to “the most noble sort [who] may be justly 
termed vates” and who “imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God,” as well as 
“right poets […] having no law but wit” (Sidney 101-2).  “Idea” denotes the particular 
plan in the mind of the poet that precedes his expression in a poem, but Sidney’s use of 
the word does not specify whether it is a product of the poet’s own creation, or 
something that the poet receives from God. 
One critic who argues that Sidney attaches divine inspiration to all kinds of 
poetic creation is Moore.  He argues that Sidney defends all fiction as divinely inspired 
prophecy, writing that “[a]lthough Sidney occasionally gets lost in flights of fancy, he 
never wavers in his basic conviction of the importance of divine inspiration to poetry 
[…] For Sidney, prophetic inspiration is a feature not only of divine poetry but also of 
‘right’ poetry” (37-8).  Moore argues, as I do, that the distinction Sidney makes between 
prophets and “right poets” is not clearly set (37).  But he also argues that Sidney sees all 
poetic creation as divinely inspired prophecy (Moore 37).  To defend this claim, Moore 
refers to the passage where Sidney writes that the poet delivers his art “with the force of 
a divine breath” (Sidney 101); but Moore reads this passage too literally.  Sidney does 
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not say that the poet speaks with divine breath, but “with the force of a divine breath,” 
(emphasis mine) so that this passage is a metaphor which uses the power of divine 
creativity to describe the power of poetry.  When Sidney writes that poets speak “with 
the force of a divine breath,” he does not mean that they are inspired by God or 
possessed by an extrinsic divine force, but that they resemble God in their own ability to 
create (101).  This allows Sidney to associate fiction-making with the same divine 
nobility that comes with prophecy.  While Moore argues that Sidney’s connection of 
fiction to prophecy insists that all poetry is divinely inspired, I argue that Sidney 
associates the two to show that while not all poetry is divinely inspired, poetry that does 
not claim divine authority is as capable as prophecy is of revealing truth and teaching 
morality to readers. 
The title “maker” is ambiguous because it implies a variety of levels of creative 
power and ingenuity.  “Maker” was a flexible word in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries which could be used to refer to a person who builds something out of matter 
(OED maker, 1.a), or to denote God (OED maker, 2.a).  Sidney writes that the name of 
the poet, “cometh of this word poiein, which is ‘to make’: wherein I know not whether 
by luck or wisdom, we Englishmen have met with the Greeks in calling him ‘a maker’ 
[…] how high and incomparable a title it is” (99).  When Sidney first defines “vates” 
and “poiein,” he presents them as two etymological roots to a single English idea of 
poetry (99).  Later, however, when Sidney writes that there are different kinds of poets, 
he uses the words “vates” and “poiein” to distinguish between prophets and fiction-
makers.   
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 Another way that Sidney magnifies the creativity expressed through the poet’s 
title as “maker” is by using the same title to refer to both God and nature.  This isn’t to 
say that Sidney believes the poet is the same as God or nature, but that all three can 
create something meaningful where nothing was apparent before.  Sidney refers to both 
God and nature as “maker” only five paragraphs after applying this title to the poet: 
“[n]either let it be deemed to saucy a comparison to balance the highest point of man’s 
wit with the efficacy of Nature; but rather give right honor to the Heavenly Maker of 
that maker, who having made man to His own likeness, set him beyond and over all the 
works of that second nature” (101).  It is easy to read the latter “maker” in “the Maker 
of that maker” as the poet because Sidney explains just before this that the poet is a 
maker.  But Geoffrey Shepherd notes that this other “maker” is not the poet, but “that 
second nature” because Sidney believes that “God produces nature, which in turn has 
this secondary creative power […] but man with his intellect works in the same way 
(although on an infinitely reduced scale) as God worked in the first creation” (Shepherd 
158-9, n.16).  Shepherd’s reading here is also applicable to other parts of Sidney’s text, 
particularly where Sidney describes nature and the poet as performing the same creative 
act: “Nature never set forth the earth in so rich tapestry as divers poets have done” 
(100).  The poet and nature are both makers made by God and the creations of the poet 
compete with the creations of nature.  Sidney applies this, once again, to both prophets 
and “right poets.” 
Sidney believes that the poet imitates God because, like God, the poet does not 
need to rely on existing objects to create.  Furthermore, the poet performs like God 
because God made him able to do so: “having made man to His own likeness, [God] set 
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him beyond and over all the works of that second nature: which in nothing he showeth 
so much as in Poetry” (Sidney 101).  Sidney draws on Genesis and the idea that God 
created man in his image; but here he uses the allusion to say that the poet expresses 
more likeness to God than other people do.  Still, Sidney keeps poetic power below 
divine power by saying that the poet is not above nature, but rather that he “goeth hand 
in hand with Nature” (100).  Sidney elevates the poet above his readers as a godlike 
creator who can give them new things, but he also affirms that the poet is a creature of 
God even if he can perform a small-scale imitation of God’s divine creation.  The poet 
has divine power to create a world “surpassing” nature (Sidney 101); but because his 
creative power is not equal to God’s, he will always be subject to the experience of 
“that second nature” made by the Nature God provides for him (Sidney 101).  When 
Sidney compares the poet to God, he compares both the poet of fiction and the prophet.  
By doing so, Sidney does not “profane” divinity (99), but elevates fiction-making to a 
higher spiritual level because he is trying to convince them to take poetry more 
seriously as an art that can teach and strengthen morals. 
 I argue that Sidney makes effort to liken poetic creation to divine creation in 
order to emphasize the autonomy exercised by the human mind in fiction-making, but 
not all critics would agree with my reading.  E. N. Tigerstedt discusses the history of the 
idea that the poet is like a divine creator, focusing on the works of late sixteenth-century 
Neoplatonists (455).   Tigersedt doesn’t discuss Sidney in the body of his article, but in 
a footnote he excuses Sidney’s absence by writing that “[i]n his Apology for Poetry, Sir 
Philip Sidney does not directly call the poet ‘creator’” (477, n.5).  While it is true that 
Sidney does not use the word “creator,” I have shown in the previous example that 
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Sidney cites the human ability to make poetry as a sign that man was made in God’s 
image, or “likeness” (101).   
In another example of the divine creative power Sidney attaches to poetic 
making, which appears after Sidney distinguishes “right poets” from prophets, he writes 
that “the poet bringeth only his own stuff, and doth not learn a conceit out of a matter, 
but maketh matter for a conceit” (120).  According to Sidney, the poet doesn’t plan his 
poems after the world that already exists, but makes a new world from which to draw 
the plan, or conceit, of his poem.  Sidney does not use the verb “maketh” lightly here, 
but to describe the conception and expression of things which extend solely from the 
poet’s mind.  Even if Sidney doesn’t use the word “creator,” he still works to elevate 
poetic making by comparing it to divine creation. 
There are other places in the Apology where Sidney relates poetic and divine 
creativity, not to say that God is literally operating through the poet, but to establish a 
metaphorical relation between God’s creative power and the creative power of the poet.  
For example, Sidney writes that “right poets […] range, only reined with learned 
discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be” (102).  He does 
not say that fiction-making literally makes the poet divine, but that the poet’s ability to 
see beyond what already exists and into “what may be and should be” is comparable to 
God’s (and the prophet’s) ability to do the same.  That the “right poet,” or fiction-maker 
Sidney describes here needs to learn his own discretion as he partakes in the art of 
poesy, is further evidence of his autonomy as a creator.  This poet needs to exercise 
discretion to know what “should be” precisely because he is not receiving guidance 
from a divine source as he performs his creative act. 
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The ability of the poet to create fictions without relying on external sources of 
guidance and inspiration is a strong statement for the power and freedom of the human 
mind, but Sidney does not believe this ability is afforded to everyone.  Even though 
Sidney rejects the idea that all poetic creation is the result of immediate divine 
inspiration, he does believe that God directed the poet’s creative power by making it 
part of his natural inclination.  Sidney writes that “a poet no industry can make, if his 
own genius be not carried unto it; and therefore it is an old proverb orator fit, poeta 
nascitur” (132), which means, “Orators are made, poets are born.”  Sidney says here 
that regardless of effort, no one will become a poet if they were not given a special 
inclination toward poetry at birth.  Sidney’s “right poet” resembles the prophet in that 
he is distinguished from his peers by a calling which he doesn’t choose for himself.  
However, as I have already argued, Sidney attributes all aspects of the creative process 
behind the “right poet” to the human mind (102). 
The poet operates through a creative faculty that is inherent to his human nature, 
but the unequal distribution of his faculty elevates him above his peers so that he must 
take on the task of moving readers.  Sidney writes that poets should “delight to move 
men to take that goodness in hand, which without delight they would fly as from a 
stranger, and teach, to make them know that goodness whereunto they are moved” 
(103).   Poetry can both “delight” and “teach” because it is both fanciful and it serves a 
practical purpose.  Sidney argues that, although imagined, the world performed by the 
poet has a substantial effect on the reader by enacting positive change in the character 
and moral stature of that reader (both of which are implied by “goodness”).   
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My analysis of the creative process Sidney attaches to poetry reveals that the 
poet of fiction exercises complete freedom of conception and expression.  At the other 
end of this process, the poet does not have the power to determine the reception of his 
creations by readers.  Sidney argues that the poet fulfills the end of his art in moving the 
reader “to take that goodness in hand” which the poet makes and expresses (103).  The 
metaphorical gesture of acceptance conveyed here indicates that the lesson of the fiction 
can only be learned by a reader willing to accept it.  As much as Sidney empowers his 
poet with divine inventions and the art of perfect expression, he cannot be certain that 
the reader will “take” what the poet offers. 
Sidney mentions both prophetic poets and poets who make fiction in his 
Apology, but it is only the second group which he really needs to defend against the 
accusations that poetry promotes inactivity, that it deceives readers, and that it corrupts 
their morals.  He believes that fiction is just as helpful as prophecy for making the 
world a better place by teaching and strengthening morals and helping people 
experience any divine perfection that is absent in an imperfect world.  Sidney shows 
people the goodness of fictional poetry by showing them the ways in which it is 
comparable to prophecy, suggesting that he expected people not to dismiss the divine 
authority behind prophecy as quickly as they would dismiss fiction.  Sidney turns this 
around, however, when he uses divine creation to describe the power of people to make 
fiction.  The authority of prophecy becomes comparable to the authority Sidney invests 
in fiction.  The parallels Sidney draws between divine creation and poetic creation 
encompass every step of the creative process from the conception of the poetic “Idea” 
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and the making of that “Idea” in verbal expression, to the reception of the poetic 
creation by readers. 
 
Chapter 3: John Milton’s Paradise Lost  
 Paradise Lost, first published in twelve books in 1674, offers a detailed 
narrative of the conflict between Heaven and Hell, Genesis, life in Eden, and the 
temptation and Fall of Mankind.  Much like Sidney uses the poetic qualities of 
prophecy to elevate and defend fictional poetry in his Apology, Milton uses a prophetic 
formula in Paradise Lost so that his highly creative fiction may be received more 
seriously and carefully by its readers.  Recall how Sidney writes his Apology with the 
awareness that some people believe holy and prophetic matters are profaned when they 
are associated with the art of fiction-making: “I fear me I seem to profane that holy 
name [vates], applying it to Poetry, which is among us is thrown down to so ridiculous 
an estimation” (99).  The speaker of Paradise Lost, who is a literary representation of 
Milton, emphasizes that the epic is prophecy, suggesting that Milton is concerned about 
tying the religious subject matter of the poem too closely to his own fiction-making.  
Early readers of Paradise Lost received the poem as a work of fiction and Milton did 
not necessarily intend for them to do otherwise.3  However, the relationship between the 
speaker and the muse within the text conveys the epic as a prophecy, elevating the 
mood of the epic by conveying it as a work of divine authority. 
 
                                                 
3 For an article on the reception of Paradise Lost by some of Milton’s contemporary readers, see William 
Poole, “Two Early Readers of Milton: John Beale and Abraham Hill,” Milton Quarterly 38.2 (2004): 76-
99. 
 
24 
 
Summoning the Muse: the Uneasy Creativity of Milton’s Speaker  
 Milton’s speaker presents Paradise Lost as prophecy, not fiction, identifying 
himself as a retriever of knowledge, not as a creator.  In the three prologues during 
which he calls upon the muse, Milton’s speaker reduces his own agency as a creator and 
elevates the religious authority of what he says by claiming that is comes from a muse 
who is directly connected to God.  Milton’s speaker doesn’t let himself slip into the 
category of poets Sidney would call “right poets,” but presents himself as a poet rather 
like the “vates,” or prophets who “imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God” 
(Sidney 102).  Even though most readers would approach Paradise Lost as a work of 
fiction, the speaker Milton places in the epic masks the fictitiousness of his accounts 
with the effect of elevating the tone and giving the epic the appearance of divine 
authority. 
 The speaker most emphasizes the supposed divine authority of the epic when he 
summons the muse throughout the epic.  Following the conventions of the epic form, 
the speaker first evokes the muse at the beginning of Book 1:  
[i]nstruct me, for thou know’st; thou from the first  
Wast present […]  
Say first, for Heav’n hides nothing from thy view  
Nor that deep tract of Hell, say first what cause 
Moved our grand parents in that happy state, 
Favored of Heav’n so highly, to fall off” (1.19-28). 
 
According to these lines, the account the epic presents of the Fall of Mankind is not 
being created by a poet, but received from Heaven.  The muse the speaker consults here 
already knows what the epic poem will reveal because she has already experienced it 
(“thou from the first / Wast present”).  From the beginning of the first book, the speaker 
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frames the poem almost as a historical account retrieved from a first-hand source, not as 
a work of fiction.   
This passage, in which the speaker first summons the muse, also draws attention 
to the presence of the muse’s voice behind the epic when the speaker repeats commands 
that the muse “say first” (1.25-6).  When the speaker transitions from his evocation of 
the muse to the beginning of his narration, the muse’s response to the evocation is 
channeled through the speaker: “Who first seduced them to that foul revolt? / 
Th’infernal Serpent; he it was” (1.33-4).  The speaker’s question flows seamlessly into 
what would be the muse’s response, but the absence of quotations or other punctuation 
indicating a change of speaker suggests that the voice of the muse is joined with the 
voice of Milton’s speaker.  This prologue allows the speaker to assert his presence 
behind the narrative of the epic while he negates his own creation of the epic by 
showing that a higher source, more divine and more knowledgeable than himself, is 
speaking through him. 
The second time Milton’s speaker calls upon his muse, he reveals that the muse 
not only communicates to him by speaking, but also by illuminating truths hidden 
within the speaker’s mind.  The process by which the speaker conceives the contents of 
the epic is located within his mind, but it is framed as a process of discovery, not of 
creation.  Milton writes of the speaker, who now addresses the muse as “celestial 
Light”: 
 […] thou celestial Light 
 Shine inward, and the mind through all her powers 
 Irradiate, there plant eyes, all mist from thence 
 Purge and disperse, that I may see and tell 
 Of things invisible to mortal sight. (3.51-5) 
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To conceive the epic, the speaker must look within himself and see things which, 
although they don’t exist in the world around him, have always been hidden in his 
mind.  Inner illumination doesn’t allow the poem’s speaker to create anything, but to 
perceive things more clearly and to convey them as he sees them (“that I may see and 
tell”).  The speaker could not do this without the participation of the muse who must 
“shine inward,” “irradiate,” “plant eyes,” and “purge and disperse,” all so that the 
speaker may simply observe and imitate, much like Sidney writes that prophetic poets 
“imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God” (101).  As in the evocation of the muse 
in Book 1, the speaker presents himself here as a passive figure who needs to be acted 
upon by the muse, and one who claims to receive and repeat the contents of the poem, 
but not to make them.   
 Another scholar who reads these evocations of the muse as windows into the 
mental process behind the expression of Milton’s poem is Martha Lifson.  She also sees 
the muse as necessary to the poet’s self-transformation (45).  Lifson argues that the 
muse is a mediator “between the inspiration which is behind a work of poetry and the 
more mechanical talents necessary to bring it into being” (60, n.15).  More specifically, 
the muse mediates between God, who is the source of the poet’s inspiration, and the 
poet who, because of his fallen condition, cannot see these divine truths clearly enough 
to convey them.  The contents of the poem are “invisible to mortal sight” (3.55), or they 
are invisible to even the poet unless the muse makes it possible for the poet to see them. 
Reading the muse as a mediator, as Lifson does, puts the muse at the center of the 
process, linking divine knowledge to the mind of the poet.  Lifson’s reading affirms my 
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argument that Milton’s speaker does not create what he conveys, but receives it from a 
higher source. 
The first two evocations of the muse illustrate how Milton’s poetic speaker is 
not one of what Sidney would call the “right poets” who operate under “no law but 
wit,” but is one of the “vates” who “imitates the inconceivable excellencies of God” 
(Sidney 98).  Recall that Sidney defines “right poets” as poets who imitate their own 
ideas instead of things God has already created because these poets have “no law but 
wit” (101-2).  Milton’s speaker does not claim to operate under the law of his own wit, 
but to depend upon the muse for guidance: “govern thou my song, / Urania” (7.30-1).  
That Urania should guide or “govern” the poet’s song indicates that the speaker is 
guided by the divine law of a nature which he did not create for himself, but recovered 
from the muse’s memory of a lost state of being, or paradise.   
Milton’s speaker not only presents himself as a prophet by using the muse as a 
source of mediation between himself and God, but also identifies his work as prophecy 
by comparing himself to ancient prophets such as Homer.  This allusion is not only an 
attempt to engage classical traditions, but also another opportunity for Milton’s speaker 
to reveal the mental mechanics behind his poetic expression.  Milton’s speaker 
addresses the reader here, asking her to regard him among the ancient prophets: 
[…] nor sometimes forget 
Those other two equaled with me in fate, 
So were I equal with them in renown, 
Blind Thamyris and blind Maeonides, 
And Tiresias and Phineus prophets old: 
Then [I] feed on thoughts, that voluntary move 
Harmonious numbers; as the wakeful bird 
Sings darkling, and in shadiest covert hid 
Tunes her nocturnal note. (3.32-40) 
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When the speaker writes that Thamyris and Maeonides, or Homer, equal him in fate, he 
refers to their common blindness.  The speaker uses the subjunctive mood in line 35 to 
express that he does not have the fame, or “renown,” of these prophets, but that he 
might gain it through the reader’s association of Paradise Lost with Classical works.  In 
line 37, the speaker transitions from his brief discussion of prophets into the description 
of his own action and the mental process that precedes his delivery of prophecy through 
poetry.  He “feed[s] on thoughts,” so that instead of creating thoughts, he is consuming 
thoughts which he either receives from the muse or discovers in himself with the aid of 
the muse.  The thoughts “voluntary move / Harmonious numbers,” meaning that they 
are transformed into the measured and musical verses of Milton’s poem naturally, 
without any imposed artifice.  The last three lines of this passage present a metaphor in 
which prophecies move through the speaker as naturally as music moves through the 
nightingale.  This metaphor works to distance the speaker from the status of an artist 
and ‘maker’ and to present his account of the events in the epic as something natural, 
instinctive and unplanned, unlike a contrived work of fiction.  For the speaker to reveal 
the poem as naturally and artlessly as the nightingale sings suggests that he is doing 
nothing more than conveying prophetic truth as he receives it.  Every time Milton 
asserts his voice as the speaker of the poem, he distances himself from the creation and 
artistry that might be associated with the literary work so that he appears not to be 
creating fiction, but to be revealing the truth of prophecy.   
 Kent Lehnhof argues that the speaker in Paradise Lost revokes his authority by 
calling on the muse because the monist doctrine Milton adheres to dictates that no 
creature of God can create like God without injuring God’s authority.  Lehnhof writes 
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that “[t]he epic’s underlying impulse to limit creation to God the Father further 
manifests itself in Milton’s ambivalent approach to his role as author.  Although Milton 
yearns to call attention to himself as the poetic maker of Paradise Lost, this position 
threatens to place him in an adversarial relationship to God” (33).  Lehnhof goes on to 
compare the danger in taking a bold stance toward authorship of the epic to Satan’s 
aspirations of equaling God (34-5).  But earlier in his essay, he also notes that Milton 
was the first English author to claim authority over his work through contracts with his 
printers (Lehnhof 17).  This reading assumes that there is a religious conflict in Milton 
as an author who claims creative authority over his literature while promoting a 
theology in which it is blasphemous to do so.  Lehnhof’s reading accurately assesses the 
manner in which Milton’s speaker evades the status of a creator, but there may be a 
more simple explanation for his apparent need to do so. 
 Milton’s speaker uses the muse to repeatedly emphasize his lack of creative 
authority because, like Sidney, Milton is sensitive to the tendency of some people to see 
fiction as something incompatible with truth and divinity.  Milton’s conflation of truth 
and fiction in the epic actually shows that he does think human and divine creativity are 
compatible.  Like Sidney, Milton uses prophecy as a precedent to elevate fictional 
poetry and make it seem more serious so that it is harder for the reader to dismiss the 
poem without fully considering its contents.  The fact that Milton is making things up 
about Heaven, Hell and the creation of the world is undeniable, but to openly present 
these things as fiction would not allow the poem to make the claims that it does to 
divine authority. 
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 Milton avoids identifying his speaker with creative power, but he presents God 
as a poetic figure by showing that all of his creations extend from his words.  Milton’s 
God, especially during his creation of the world in Book 7, comes closer to resembling 
Sidney’s conception of the “right poet” than the speaker of the poem does.  This 
becomes clear through comparison of the speaker’s brief description of the mental 
process behind his poetry in the prologue to Book 3 to the description of God’s creation 
in Book 7.  The speaker says that “thoughts” precede his poetic expression: “thoughts, 
that voluntary move / Harmonious numbers” (3.37-8).  In a later passage describing 
Genesis, the speaker refers to God’s “Idea” behind the creation of the world: 
 [t]hence to behold His new-created world  
 Th’addition of His empire, how it showed 
 In prospect from His throne, how good, how fair, 
 Answering his great Idea. (7.554-7) 
Whereas “thought” applies to any mental state or process and has no immediate 
connection to creativity, “Idea,” as an English word, becomes directly associated with 
poetic creativity through Sidney’s Apology (OED, idea, 2.b).  The difference in meaning 
between these two words points to the distinction Milton’s speaker makes between God 
as a creator and himself as a prophet, or a recipient of information who does not create, 
but discovers what he describes.  Like Sidney’s version of the same word, “Idea” has 
Platonic undertones in this passage, but it also departs from the Platonic concept of the 
term in order to accommodate divine creation.  God’s creation brings form to his 
“Idea,” but the created world is more than a shadow or diminished copy of God’s 
“Idea.”  The physical creation of the world is “[a]nswering” the “Idea,” meaning that it 
complements and fulfills the “Idea.”  Much like the plan that comes before a poem, 
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God’s “Idea” is part of his creative process that isn’t completed until it is answered by 
its expression or creation.   
Milton’s God resembles Sidney’s poet, as Sidney writes in his Apology that the 
poet’s “Idea” is his mental plan for poetic expression (101).  Sidney’s Apology 
attributes the creative “Idea” to the poet and uses “divine breath” as a metaphor to 
describe the power of poetic creation (101).  The word “Idea” is associated only with 
God in Milton’s epic, and not the speaker, following Milton’s tendency within the epic 
to mask fiction with prophecy.  Applying different terms to the thought processes of the 
poet and God prevents the narration of the epic from resembling an act of divine 
creation.  But as the next section reveals, Milton also draws strong correlations between 
the divine and the poetic through the idea of generative language and of the reception 
and interpretation of creations by others.  The work ultimately shows itself to be fiction 
so that the effort of the speaker to revoke his authority over the contents of the epic is 
actually a performance that does not reflect the human creativity that is truly happening 
in the production of the poem.   
 
Poetic Creation as Divine Creation 
 Even though the poem’s speaker conveys the epic as a prophecy rather than a 
fiction and avoids describing himself as a creator, the epic is a work of fiction and there 
are parallels between God’s generative use of language and the poetic creation 
performed by the language of the poem.  Furthermore, there is a close parallel between 
the freedom of people to interpret, accept, or reject God’s creations, and the freedom 
Milton knows his readers have in receiving his poem to disagree with the political and 
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theological arguments he conveys.  Milton’s speaker is more divinely creative than he is 
willing to reveal in the poem.  He is more than one kind of poet: he accesses both the 
nobility Sidney associates with prophetic poets, and the free range of the poet who 
makes fiction. 
 God is like a poet in Paradise Lost because all of his creative power is in his 
ability to create things with words.  When God shares his plans for creation through 
prophesy in Book 3, he not only perceives things and describes them as they are, but his 
language also brings new things forth by describing them as he makes them.  The first 
characterization Milton provides of God is set in Heaven, as God and the Son discuss 
Satan’s rebellion and prepare a response to Heaven’s loss of a third of its angels to Hell 
(3.80-265).  When God first speaks, ending with a declaration of the role he will play 
through his Son, the poet reiterates what he says in the third person, demonstrating that 
God’s words are visibly manifested in the space around him.  Milton writes of God 
speaking and the response his words evoke in his environment: 
 […] in mercy and justice both, 
 Through Heav’n and earth, so shall my glory excel, 
 But mercy first and last shall brightest shine.” 
 Thus while God spake, ambrosial fragrance filled 
 All Heav’n, and in the blessed Spirits elect 
 Sense of new joy ineffable diffused: 
 Beyond compare the Son of God was seen 
 Most glorious, in him all his Father shone 
 Substantially expressed, and in his face 
 Divine compassion visibly appeared. (3.132-41) 
In this passage, God’s words assume a physical and sensible (fragrant) presence in 
Heaven and the intentions his words convey are manifested in the Son and the listening 
angels.  The poet conveys this manifestation by echoing God’s speech with a 
descriptive interpretation of the scene in Heaven.  The words “glory” (3.133) and 
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“mercy” (3.134) at the end of God’s speech are reflected in “glorious” (3.139) and 
“compassion” (3.141) in the poet’s following description of the Son.  As God says that 
he will be glorious and merciful, the Son, who will perform his intentions, “was seen” 
glorious and “visibly appeared” compassionate (3.138-41).  All of God’s language 
generates reality in his passage because it is physically manifested in the world around 
him as he speaks.   
 Stanley Fish approaches God’s prophetic language from a different angle, noting 
that Milton gives God a simple-seeming speech in which “metaphorical and affective 
language are rejected in favor of the objective style of Baconian empiricism” (61).  Fish 
sees God’s language as objective and empirical because it is not rhetorical or 
persuasive, but seems to do nothing more than describe things as they are.  This 
comparison works for describing the style of God’s language, but it does not apply to 
what God’s language is doing in the physical space of the poem.  God does not 
withhold himself to observe his environment and describe it as it is.  The response of 
the poet’s narration to his speech in Book 3 shows that God extends himself into his 
environment and generates new things as he applies words to them. 
 God uses words to make new worlds much like the poet uses words to construct 
the world of the poem.  While the poetic speaker’s account of the scene in Book 3 
describes the way God’s environment responds to his prophetic voice, the ability of 
God’s language to perform what he says is more explicit in the description of Genesis in 
Book 7.  When Raphael visits Eden, he provides an account of the six-day Genesis to 
Adam.  To create the world, Raphael recounts that God sends the Son out as the 
embodiment of his “Word” to convey his intentions to Chaos.  Milton takes language 
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almost directly from the Bible when he lists each of God’s verbal commands followed 
by a description of the physical creation that follows: “‘Let there be light,’ said God, 
and forthwith light / Ethereal, first of things, quintessence pure / Sprung from the deep” 
(7.243-4).  Just like God’s prophetic speech in Book 3, in which the poet’s narration of 
the scene in heaven immediately echoes God’s words, his words command immediate 
material response from Chaos in this passage.  Raphael says that God instructs the Son 
as the embodiment of his words: “thou my Word, begotten Son, by thee / This I 
perform, speak thou, and be it done” (7.163-4).  God performs creation through his 
words and the difference between the expression of God’s language and the creative act 
his language points to is indiscernible.   
 The generative power of God’s speech here is a perfect example of what J.L. 
Austin has called “performative language.”  A performative statement does not describe 
anything that exists, nor it is false, but rather it performs an action which cannot exist 
apart from the verbal expression itself (Austin 5).  Some familiar examples are the 
statement “I promise” and the declaration “I do” in a marriage ceremony (Austin 7).  
While performatives do not describe reality, they actually generate it.  There is a special 
category for performative speech because not all of our language can be performative.  
However, during Raphael’s account of Genesis, when God embodies his “Word” in the 
Son, all of his language is performative.  Speaking and doing are simultaneous: “speak 
thou, and be it done” (7.164).  God uses language in Genesis in a way that truly unites 
word and action. 
 The heightened performativity of God’s language in this passage seems to 
distinguish the power of his speech from any kind of generative power that could be 
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performed through human speech.  However, everything the reader learns in this 
passage is conveyed through the language of Milton’s poem.  Just like all of God’s 
language in Genesis generates the world, all of the poet’s language generates the world 
of the poem in the reader’s mind.  God and the poet are both essentially makers of 
worlds, and Milton brings this connection to the reader’s attention by emphasizing that 
God’s Genesis is performed entirely through language.  Even though the poem’s 
speaker presents himself as a prophet and never says that he ‘makes’ anything as a poet, 
a comparison of the generative quality of God’s language in Genesis to the way in 
which the language of the poem generates a world in the reader’s mind suggests that the 
poet behind Paradise Lost is more godlike in his creativity than the prophetic stance he 
takes in the poem allows him to appear. 
 To further reveal the creative power which the poem’s speaker conceals, note 
that his blindness, which he brings to the reader’s attention in Book 7, requires him to 
imitate no other object but what appears in his own thoughts.  The poet’s blindness not 
only allows him to draw on the authority of other prophetic writers, but it also helps to 
explain the process by which he either creates or offers readers knowledge they can’t 
find in nature.  The speaker describes his blindness the second time he summons the 
muse: 
 […] ever-during dark 
 Surrounds me from the cheerful ways of men 
 Cut off, and for the book of knowledge fair 
 Presented with a universal blank 
 Of nature’s works to me expunged and razed. (3.45-9) 
The metaphor comparing the speaker’s knowledge to an empty book expresses the 
internalization of the outward “book of knowledge” that follows blindness.  This points 
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to how the contents of the epic are being drawn from no outward object, but from 
within the mind of the speaker before he expresses them.  The question remains of 
whether the speaker is filling his newly emptied book of knowledge with creative 
fictions, or if another mind, such as that of the muse or even God, is actually conveying 
it to him. 
Joanna Picciotto writes that while the speaker’s blindness cuts him off from the 
book of nature, he finds power in writing a new one: “as he draws the reader’s eye from 
one divine text to another—from creation to the poem she is holding in her hand—
lamentation fluctuates into self-assertion” (47-8).  In this reading, the blindness of 
Milton’s poet makes him godlike because it forces him to rewrite nature within his mind 
instead of reading it through the metaphorical book of visible creation.  Insofar as “self-
assertion” implies a claim to authority, Picciotto’s statement is true of Milton as an 
author, but does not accurately describe the stance Milton’s speaker outwardly assumes 
in this passage.  Rather, he asks the muse to give him a new set of eyes so he can see a 
new nature within: “[s]hine inward / […] there plant eyes” (3.51-2).  The speaker 
always emphasizes the role of the muse as one who reveals to him what the reader 
might otherwise assume he creates as fiction.  Milton the author might, as Picciotto 
observes, see his ability to be inwardly inspired through blindness to write the poem as 
an opportunity to assert authority, but the speaker passes all authority up to the muse. 
There are more opportunities for the reader to draw parallels between Milton’s 
speaker and God by looking closely at the content of the poem.  David Quint points out 
an important connection between the speaker’s flight, aided by the muse, and the Son’s 
flight in Genesis, aided by God.  Quint observes that while Milton connects the 
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Classical stories of the failed flights of Icarus and Phaeton to Satan in his ambition to 
equal God, Milton rewrites these stories as flights of success when he applies the same 
allusions to both the poem’s speaker and the Son of God (847).  Icarus flew toward the 
sun when the wax holding his wings together melted and he fell to his death, while 
Phaeton attempted to pull the sun through the sky by chariot and drove it off course.  
Both of these disasters are attributed to excessive ambition and both involve beings 
flying too close to the sun.  These myths work to describe the creative works of the poet 
and the Son because they both approach Godhead in their creativity and Milton defines 
God as a light as unapproachable as the sun: “God is light, / And never but in 
unapproached light / Dwelt from eternity” (3.3-5).  Arguing, as I do, that Milton draws 
subtle connections between divine creation and the poetic creation of the poem, Quint 
writes that “Milton juxtaposes the mythical figures in a similar way to promise himself 
the godlike exaltation of poetry” (875).  By drawing a connection between the figure of 
the poet and the Son of God through allusions in the epic, Milton subtly reveals that the 
poem’s speaker is more godlike, or more creative, in his role as a poet than he 
outwardly presents himself to be. 
 The speaker of Paradise Lost reveals his own creative power through subtle 
reference at least once in the epic. In a description of Eden, the speaker brings poetic 
creativity to the surface of the poem and reminds the reader that she is experiencing a 
fictional world.  The speaker reflects on the difficulty of using the art to describe 
something as natural and artless as the true Eden: 
 [b]ut rather to tell how, if art could tell, 
 How from that sapphire fount the crispèd brooks, 
 Rolling on orient pearl and sands of gold, 
 With mazy error under pendent shades 
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 Ran nectar, visiting each plant, and fed 
 Flow’rs worthy of Paradise which not nice art 
 In beds and curious knots, but nature boon 
 Poured forth profuse on hill and dale and plain. (4.236-43) 
There is an analogy developed in this passage in which artful poetic expression is 
comparable to the contrived nature of a manmade garden while a purer form of 
expression is comparable to the nature of Eden.  The speaker expresses concern at the 
beginning of the passage that his human art will not be able to accurately “tell how” 
God’s Eden appeared.  This anxiety appeals to accuracy, suggesting that the speaker is 
aiming for an artless representation of truth, which applies to the act of conveying 
prophecy.  However, the descriptive language used in this passage is very artful and, 
arguably, one of the most aesthetically pleasing passages in the entire poem.  It is 
detailed and sensuous which suits the idea of Eden as a place of perfection and pleasure.  
Art and nature seem irreconcilable, but they are inseparable here because the perfection 
of Eden cannot be accessed without art, just as Sidney writes that the poet brings a 
golden world to the brazen one by “freely ranging within the zodiac of his own wit” 
(100).  The Classical golden world is not the same as the Christian paradise, but in both 
of these examples, creativity helps people access an ideal state that is impossible to 
experience in the real world. 
 Moving from the generative power of language to the susceptibility of language 
to interpretation, the speaker of Paradise Lost continues to resemble Milton’s God.  
Even though God uses language to generate worlds that perfectly reflect his intentions, 
his extension of free will to all created beings allows people to interpret and react to his 
creations in varying ways, and even to turn against him as Satan does.  God’s 
willingness to let his creatures freely react to his creations parallels the poet’s 
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powerlessness over readers’ varying interpretations of his work.  Milton’s speaker does 
not present himself as a godlike creator, but a closer look at the vulnerability of his 
creation to unfit readers shows that his role as the deliverer of the poem resembles 
God’s role as creator of the world. 
 The argument the speaker asserts at the beginning of Book 1 demonstrates the 
freedom people have to interpret God’s creations as they please.  Milton’s speaker 
reveals his intentions in conveying the epic: “[t]hat to the height of this great argument / 
I may assert Eternal Providence, / And justify the ways of God to men” (1.24-6).  The 
speaker needs to “justify the ways of God to men” because God allows people to think 
freely and some choose to see him as unjust.   
 Satan and his followers are the first example of God’s creatures rebelling against 
him in spite of his role as omnipotent creator.  God delivers a speech in Heaven in 
which he expresses his favor for his Son and while everyone seems to receive the 
speech with joy, Satan receives it with envy.  The Angel Raphael recounts God’s speech 
to Adam and Eve, then says, “[s]o spake th’Omnipotent, and with his words / All 
seemed well pleased, all seemed, but were not all” (5.616-17).  When God performs his 
“Word” through the figure of his Son during Genesis, there is no room for 
interpretation.  Here, however, God delivers a speech in which his words mean different 
things to different listeners.   
Not all of God’s language can be performative like it is in Genesis because this 
would exclude the possibility of free will.  In Book 3, God explains to his Son that 
Adam and Eve will fall for the same reason that Satan and his followers fell from 
Heaven:  
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I made him [Adam] just and right,  
Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall.  
Such I created all th’ethereal Powers   
And Spirits, both them who stood and them who failed; 
Freely they stood who stood, and fell who fell. (Milton 3.98-102) 
God believes that for his creatures to have free will, they must have the freedom to 
interpret his creations and his role as a creator however they please.  It is important to 
God that his creatures are not forced to submit to him, but that they make the choice to 
accept his authority.  This is the same approach that Milton takes toward his readers. 
Milton was aware that he was writing a poem that would be interpreted 
differently by different people and this becomes apparent in the epic when he expresses 
anxiety about angry readers through the poem’s speaker.  The speaker of Milton’s poem 
anticipates a rebellion similar to that Satan carried against God, but rather a rebellion 
against his literary creations.  The poet has godlike power to use language to generate a 
world, and he faces the same vulnerability to interpretation that God chooses to face in 
the interest of preserving free will.  In a Classical allusion to the murder of the poet 
Orpheus, Milton’s speaker seeks protection from the muse against the wrath of angry 
readers: 
 Still govern thou my song, 
 Urania, and fit audience find though few. 
 But drive far off the barbarous dissonance 
 Of Bacchus and his revelers, the race 
 Of that wild rout that tore the Thracian bard 
 In Rhodope, there woods and rocks had ears 
 To rapture, till the savage clamor drowned 
 Both harp and voice. (7.30-7) 
The speaker feels that only a few of his readers will interpret his text as he intends them 
to, so he asks Urania to find him “fit audience though few” (7.31).  In the same way that 
he passes his creative authority on to the muse in earlier passages, he also gives her 
41 
 
credit here for the transmission of his text among readers.  The following allusion to 
Orpheus conveys that Milton’s speaker fears some readers will not only misread his 
work, but will also rebel against him and seek to destroy him and his poetry, just as the 
Bacchantes destroyed “[b]oth harp and voice” when they murdered Orpheus (7.37).4  
The potentially destructive reaction of readers to the epic poem parallels the rebellion of 
Satan and his followers against God.  However, unlike the poet, God does not feel 
threatened by Satan’s rebellion because he is omnipotent.   
 Many critics have discussed the different ways in which Milton enlists the 
participation of his readers by confronting them with moral and interpretive decisions 
throughout the epic.  Fish argues that Milton intends for there to be a disconnection 
between the reader’s reaction to Satan’s seductive speeches in Books 1 and 2 and the 
evaluation of those speeches by the epic voice so that the reader will be invited to make 
the choice of correcting her reactions (4-6).  This is almost exactly like the correcting 
voice God offers to fallen mankind: “[t]he rest shall hear me call, and oft be warned / 
Their sinful state” (Milton 3.185-6).  More recent critics agree that Milton actively 
engages the reader’s interpretive process, but they place more emphasis on the reader’s 
interpretive freedom.  Andrew Mattison argues that “Milton’s poetics does not 
constitute a direct bridge between intent and interpretation but rather creates a world of 
diverse meanings through which interpretation is given no more than the vaguest 
direction” (11-2).  This accurately describes instances of indeterminacy throughout the 
poem, in which Milton seems to purposefully give his readers multiple interpretive 
                                                 
4 For a brief description of the myth alluded to in this passage, see George M. Logan, Stephen Greenblatt, 
Barbara K. Lewalski, and Katharine Eisaman Maus. The Norton Anthology of English Literature: Volume 
B. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2006. 1947, n.7. Print.  
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possibilities to choose from.5  Picciotto, like Mattison, argues that the reader, not the 
narrator, guides the discovery of meaning in the poem: “the epic requires a reader 
willing to invest care in making truth visible” (47).  God chooses to give free will to his 
creatures, whereas Milton knows, as any other writer does, that he cannot take away the 
reader’s will to form her own interpretation of his work.  To the contrary, Milton is 
interested in augmenting the reader’s free will by giving her more control over the 
meaning of the poem.   
 Even though Milton’s speaker tries to remove himself from the role of creator, a 
closer analysis of the ways in which God’s language and the speaker’s language are 
working in the poem reveals that the poem’s speaker is more Godlike and more creative 
than he claims to be.  The final section of this chapter shows that while Milton wants his 
reader’s to participate in constructing the poem’s meaning, the speaker of the poem 
does not think that any reader could fill his position as the narrator of the epic.  
 
From Paradise Lost to ‘Paradise Within’ 
Much like Sidney’s idea of the poet, Milton’s poet exercises a unique talent in 
conveying the poem.  There is a connection between divine election and the speaker’s 
ability to convey the epic that resembles Sidney’s belief in the “old proverb, orator fit, 
poeta nascitur” (Sidney 132), or “orators are made, poets are born.”  The next chapter 
will reveal that Traherne is very different, but both Sidney and Milton see poetic 
expression as a divinely elected vocation that people cannot pursue by choice.  Milton’s 
                                                 
5 For example, see the discussion between Adam and Raphael around the structure of the solar system 
(7.5-158).  Milton leaves his reader to choose between the Ptolemaic model proposed by Adam and 
Copernican model that Raphael’s response suggests. 
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God graces Adam, Eve and their descendants with the ability to achieve paradise after 
death through faith and good works, but he does not give everyone the ability to see and 
regenerate the lost Eden in the same way that Milton’s speaker does. 
At the end of the last book of Milton’s epic, the Angel Michael tells Adam and 
Eve that they will be able to survive their tragic loss of Eden because they will now 
have a “paradise within.”  He tells the couple what they must do to achieve this: 
[…] only add 
Deeds to thy knowledge answerable, add faith, 
Add virtue, temperance, add love, 
By name to come called charity, the soul 
Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loath 
To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess 
A paradise within thee, happier far. (12.581-7)6 
 
This is another part of the epic where the reader is invited to question the nature of the 
poetic creativity behind the poem because it provokes the question of whether the 
poem’s speaker was able to reveal lost Eden because he, like Adam and Eve, has a 
“paradise within.”  However, I argue that this passage refers to two different concepts of 
paradise.  The two different pronouns introducing them announces this grammatically: 
Eden, which is the place the poet describes, is “this” Paradise because there is only one 
of them, whereas the inward paradise is “a” paradise because there is one inside every 
person who seeks it.  The reader also knows the two versions of paradise are different 
because Michael contrasts them, saying that the paradise within is “happier far” 
(12.587).  The mental and spiritual labor Adam and Eve must perform in order to have 
paradise within is also not the same as the labor which the speaker performs, with the 
                                                 
6 Contrary to the edition printed in the Norton Anthology, which I quote from in this passage, the original 
print capitalized “Paradise” in both line 586 and line 587. See John Milton, Paradise Lost, London: 1668, 
EEBO, M2138.   
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aid of the muse, to convey the contents of the epic.  Adam and Eve must demonstrate 
“faith,” “virtue” and “love,” so that having paradise within is the same as securing 
salvation and paradise after death.  Nothing about this suggests creativity, or even the 
prophetic inspiration which Milton’s speaker more openly lays claim to.  
 An alternative reading of this passage is held by Louis Martz who argues that 
“paradise within” refers to the same paradise which Milton’s speaker portrays in the 
epic.  Martz writes that “the promised redemption consists in the renewal of man’s inner 
powers: those powers of the soul by which the bard has just pursued his triumphant 
journey of the mind toward Paradise” (166).  According to Martz, Milton believes that 
anyone could access and convey the same divine knowledge that is conveyed with the 
aid of the muse throughout the epic.  As I have just shown, this is not the case.  God 
does not give everyone the ability to journey to Heaven, Hell and Eden as Milton’s 
speaker does—a feat which he attributes to his blindness and the aid of the muse. 
There is evidence of this elsewhere in the epic.  Milton rejects the Calvinist 
doctrine that all people are predestined for salvation or damnation (Logan 1875, n.6).  
Still, God states in his prophetic speech on creation of the human race, that he chooses 
to give some people a special ability to interpret the divine intentions behind his 
creation so that they can be more inclined to live without sin.  Milton’s speaker tells of 
God declaring in Heaven: 
Some I have chosen of peculiar grace 
Elect above the rest; so is my will: 
The rest shall hear me call, and oft be warned 
Their sinful state. (3.183-6) 
The word “peculiar” suggests that God chooses only a few people to be predisposed 
toward this kind of grace.  Everyone else hears God call and can “oft be warned” 
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(3.185).  But they still live in sin because they are not receptive, or not able to properly 
read God’s warnings.  In the same way, Milton’s speaker expresses concern that some 
people will be unfit to properly interpret the epic even if they can read it.  It is possible 
that Milton sees his position as a poet as a sign of his own “peculiar grace” (3.183).  
Paradise Lost seeks to “justify the ways of God to men” (1.26), but in doing so it also 
warns readers through the examples of Satan, Adam and Eve about the consequences of 
sin.  The speaker of Milton’s epic is “[e]lect above the rest” because he is able to 
convey knowledge “unattempted” (1.16), and which readers can only access through his 
poem.   
To conclude, the things Milton’s speaker discusses are framed as biblical events, 
which would not be seen by Milton and his readers as topics for fiction; but at the same 
time, the epic is very original and goes far beyond biblical precedent.  The convention 
of inspiration offered by the muse in the epic tradition allows the work to possess both 
the nobility of prophecy and the free range of fiction.  Milton clearly believes, as Sidney 
does, that people can learn valuable moral lessons from fiction.  However, Milton is 
hesitant to convey this belief explicitly within the poem because of the elevated 
religious subject matter of his poem.  As the next chapter reveals, Traherne differs from 
Milton in his readiness to teach moral lessons and regenerate lost paradise through 
fiction while openly treating fiction as such. 
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Chapter 4: Thomas Traherne’s Poems of Felicity and Centuries of Meditations 
 Traherne both embraces fiction-making as a positive sign of divinity in the 
human mind, and sees it as a negative sign of the inability of people to recognize the 
perfection of earthly paradise.  Unlike Sidney, who believes that people live in an 
imperfect or “brazen” world (100), or Milton who believes that paradise is “within” 
after the Fall (12.587), Traherne believes that the outward world is “far better than 
Paradise had men eyes to see its glories and their advantages” (Centuries 4.21).  
Traherne uses fiction to guide the reader toward a more accurate vision of the world 
around her as paradise. 
 Traherne’s approach to recovering paradise differs from Milton’s approach by 
openly engaging poetry as fiction-making and by expanding the art from a high calling 
to an activity all of his readers should perform for their own happiness and salvation.  
For Traherne, the creativity that defines poetry is something everyone must perform to 
exercise God-given divinity for, as he writes in Centuries of Meditations, “all are like 
deities” (1.74).  Traherne believes that everyone can be like God because everyone can 
create worlds like God does, but in the scaled-down space of creative thought and 
poetry.   
 Traherne was writing his last work, Centuries of Meditations, only a few years 
after Milton first published Paradise Lost.  Most of Traherne’s work remained lost in 
manuscript until it was rediscovered and published in his name almost two centuries 
after his death (Dobell vii).  This chapter will look at selections from two such works: 
Poems of Felicity and Centuries of Meditations.  Poems is a collection of spiritually 
oriented lyrics and Centuries is a prose work of short meditations divided into five 
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centuries, or groups of 100.  Partly due to the brevity of his literary career and partly 
due to the belated publication of his work, Traherne is much less well-studied than 
Milton and Sidney.  Still, this chapter shows that he engaged some of the same 
questions the former two poets were interested in surrounding the nature of human 
creativity and the usefulness of fiction. 
 
The Creative Reader in Centuries of Meditations 
 Traherne believes that everyone should be creative, like he is as a poet, so he 
encourages the reader of Centuries to co-author the book by writing her own thoughts 
into it.  The dedicatory poem that Traherne places at the beginning of Centuries tells the 
reader, to whom it was presumably given, that the book is something she can use as a 
tool for self-transformation.  The reader should be spiritually improved by both reading 
the book and writing her own thoughts in it.  The poem appears at the beginning of the 
manuscript, just before the first meditation: 
 This book unto the friend of my best friend 
 As of the wisest mark of love I send, 
 That she may write my Maker’s prais therin 
 And make herself therby a Cherubin. (Traherne 1) 
Traherne speaks directly to the primary reader of Centuries, revealing that he sends her 
the book as a gift.  This poem expresses that by writing her own praise of God, rather 
than only reading Traherne’s praise, the reader will be elevated to a higher spiritual 
state: that of a Cherubin, or angel.  It may be that the reader becomes like an angel 
figuratively during life, or that she guarantees her salvation and literal transformation 
into an angel after death, or both.  The key is that Traherne conceives a correlation 
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between writing and self-fashioning such that the words the reader chooses to put on the 
page have a real impact on her identity and her experience of the world. 
 Just after telling the reader that she can “make herself” by writing in the book 
she has in her hands, Traherne compares the blank pages of the book (which are no 
longer blank) to a human soul: “[a]n empty book is like an infant’s soul, in which 
anything may be written.  It is capable of all things, but containeth nothing.  I have a 
mind to fill this with profitable wonders” (1.1).  The reader is holding a book already 
full of wonders, but this meditation places her alongside Traherne as a witness to the 
book’s conception.  This passage uses the theory of the blank slate, or tabula rasa, in 
which a person is developed through their experiences, but specifically to say that 
reading and writing are potential ways of gaining new experience.  By reading 
Traherne’s writing, especially the autobiographical section in the “Third Century,” the 
reader profits from the experiences of Traherne and the lessons he has learned from 
those experiences.  The reader may write in the book to transform herself into a 
“Cherubin,” so that physical transformation of the book is analogous to the 
transformation of the reader’s soul.   The sense of collaboration in these opening 
passages is closely related to the primary objective of Centuries, which is to help the 
reader see the world she lives in as a paradise, or for her to have felicity.  Referring to 
himself in the third person, as he does throughout the “Fourth Century,” Traherne writes 
that “whosoever would enjoy the happiness of Paradise must put on the charity of 
Paradise.  And that nothing was his Felicity but his duty” (4.22).  The reader, like 
Traherne, owes felicity to God.  The enjoyment of the world as paradise requires “the 
charity of Paradise,” which Traherne equates to felicity.  Charity is the love and 
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fellowship that connects human beings, so that felicity requires the subject to create 
paradise not through withdrawal or inward reflection, but through community and 
collaboration with fellow Christians.  Unlike the participation Milton requires from his 
readers to construct meaning in Paradise Lost, Traherne’s version of reader 
participation is more collaborative and more democratic because it elevates the reader to 
the same level of creativity he enjoys as author.  Throughout the book, as my readings 
of later passages will make clear, Traherne enlists the reader’s participation such that 
she makes the book alongside Traherne as she reads it. 
 Traherne invites his reader to join him in authoring Centuries because he 
believes that creative thought and writing are not signs of his own special talent, but 
could be performed by anyone.  Attesting to this reading of Traherne’s universal 
approach to creative writing, James Balakier defines Traherne’s felicity, or the 
enlightenment which Centuries tries to bring to the reader, as “a transforming 
experience that Traherne adamantly believes is within everyone’s reach and is 
completely consistent with the laws governing mind and body” (206).  This is correct, 
but to elaborate further, this transforming experience is the ability of every person to 
reap mental and spiritual benefits by creating fictions, then looking out at the real world 
and writing or expressing praise of it.  Traherne writes in the opening quatrain that the 
reader will be transformed by writing praise of God (1).  This does not mean that the 
reader praises God through fiction, but it becomes clear in the “Second Century” that 
for the reader to properly conceive the joy of God’s creation and his worthiness of 
praise, she must be able to depart from God’s creation into her own fictional creations 
to return again with new eyes. 
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 Balakier argues that Traherne is an objectivist and that he seeks an empirical 
scientific approach to understanding nature (213-15).  To be objective is to distinguish 
between outward truths which are evident in nature and the interpretive impulses which 
the subject projects onto nature, while to be empirical is to seek truth through sensory 
experience.  I agree that Traherne ultimately wants his reader and he to have a shared 
experience of the world of existing objects, but to narrowly define Traherne as an 
objectivist overlooks his equally meaningful insistence that subjectivity and the 
individual exercise of creative thought is a necessary step to achieving a shared, 
outward vision of the world.   
 
Ideas, Thoughts and Things 
 Traherne works in several places throughout his writing to define the limits of 
ideas, thoughts and things, and to explain the ways in which the three act on each other 
to form human consciousness.  The amount of energy Traherne invests in explaining 
these terms indicates that they are central to the balance his philosophy reveals between 
inward creative thought and the outward acquisition of a shared understanding of the 
natural world as paradise.  Just as the word “Idea” plays a key role in the ways Sidney 
and Milton understand and convey human creativity, Traherne’s own use of the word 
reveals that he sees creative thought as a universally accessible and beneficial process.   
Traherne’s use of the word at the end of the “Second Century” shows us that 
while Traherne sees “idea” as nothing more than an instance of “thought,” he elevates 
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thought above the world as a link between God and the human subject.7  I will also 
show that “Dreams,” a poem from Traherne’s Poems of Felicity, complements this 
meditation in the “Second Century” by arguing that thoughts are more powerful than 
things because they more readily transform the subject’s experience by changing his or 
her emotions.  Because fiction is a construct of thought, Traherne holds that it can have 
a transformative impact on the human experience. 
 Traherne believes that ideas are better than things because ideas connect people 
both to God and to the world.  Meditation 2.90 is one of the longer, and certainly one of 
the most rich and dense meditations in the Centuries.  In this meditation Traherne 
explains how human perception can both redefine the nature of a thing created by God 
and please God in doing so.  Traherne argues in this meditation that ideas and thoughts 
are more valuable to God than things are because ideas and thoughts create the 
experience of things in the human mind: 
We could easily show that the idea of Heaven and Earth in the Soul of Man is 
more precious with God than the things themselves and more excellent in 
nature. […] The thought of the World wherby it is enjoyed is better than the 
World […] The world within you is an offering returned […] A Thought of the 
World, or the World in a Thought, is more excellent than the world, because it is 
spiritual and nearer unto God. (2.90)   
 
What does Traherne mean by this?  How does he define “idea”?  Sidney uses the word 
to denote the conceptual precursor to the creative act of the poet (101), while Milton 
uses the word to describe the entire plan behind God’s creation of the world (7.557).  
Traherne doesn’t use the word to distinguish himself as a poet, or to distinguish the 
mental power of God, but to describe the creative thought of the reader and all other 
                                                 
7 Dobell’s edition of Centuries preserves the spelling and capitalization of words from the manuscript, but 
Traherne, unlike Sidney and Milton, does not capitalize the word “idea.”  In modern usage, the word is 
capitalized when it is used in a Platonic sense. 
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people and the extent to which it allows them to make a “world within.”  Traherne says 
here that ideas are better, or “more excellent in nature” than things because they are 
essential to our ability to experience and enjoy things in the world (“the thought of the 
world wherby it is enjoyed”). Traherne distances himself from the Platonic “Idea” by 
understanding “idea” as a product of subjective thought that is unique to the individual 
mind.  The idea of the world or the “world within” each subject is “nearer unto God” 
because it is an “offering returned,” or the medium by which every subject completes 
the circular process of creation and reception. 
 Traherne stresses enjoyment here because he believes that God created the 
world for the purpose of its reception and contemplation by other minds.  The “idea” 
Traherne writes of is not only the medium by which the subject experiences things, but 
it is also formed by her experiences.  God created the world so that people could think 
about it: “as the end is better than the means, the thought of the World whereby it is 
enjoyed is better than the World […] it being the end of the World, without which 
Heaven and Earth would be in vain” (2.90).  Traherne does not associate “idea” with the 
plan or intention behind creation, but with the “end,” or the thought by which people 
perceive creation and recreate it in their own minds.  Traherne doesn’t describe the 
“idea” as a divine or Platonic blueprint from which the objects in the world are formed, 
but as the interpretation of creation after it is experienced and enjoyed by people.   
  The circularity that joins the experience of the individual subject to God in 
Traherne’s theology does not exclude the importance of finding a unifying reality that 
transcends the individual mind.  Robert N. Watson looks only at one side of Traherrne’s 
portrayal of human creativity when he reads Meditation 2.90 and writes that in 
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Traherne’s philosophy “[w]e do not, or at least we need not, misconstrue this universe, 
because it does not meaningfully exist outside our nearly divine consciousness of it” 
(322).  But Traherne does think people can misconstrue the universe because the motive 
behind his emphasis on creative thought, which he expresses early in the Centuries, is 
the reconstruction and correction of errant human perception: “the world is both a 
Paradise and a Prison to different persons. […] [W]e need nothing but open eyes, to be 
ravished like the Cheribims.  Well we may bear the greatness of the World, since it is 
our storehouse and treasury” (1.36-7).  People see the world differently, but if everyone 
had correct vision, or “open eyes,” everyone would see that the world is a perfect 
paradise.  Traherne aims to unify people under a single conception of the world, but he 
believes that the ability of individuals to create their own fictitious versions of the world 
is what allows them to gain a more pure vision of the real world as the paradise that 
Traherne believes it is.  
 Traherne also reveals that his ultimate goal is to turn human vision back outward 
when he writes in Meditation 2.90 that even though the reader is able to create her own 
worlds in her mind, she should choose to look outward and envision the real world 
instead.  Traherne addresses the reader: “[h]ow deformed would you be should all the 
World stand about you and you be idle: Were you able to create other worlds, God had 
rather you should think on this.  For thereby you are united unto Him. […] For God 
hath made you able to create worlds in your own mind which are more precious unto 
Him than those which he created” (2.90).  Traherne writes that even if the reader could 
create alternative worlds, God would rather that she focused on the real world.  Note 
that Traherne uses the counterfactual “were” in this sentence because he is making up a 
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hypothetical world in which the reader can create other worlds.  Traherne performs 
through this sentence the same thing which he exhorts his reader to imagine herself 
doing.  However, Traherne also says that God would rather that the reader thought on 
“this” world, or the real world around her, so that she can be united to God and his 
creation.  When Traherne returns to affirm that the reader really can make worlds in her 
mind, he assumes that the reader would make an inward reflection of the world that God 
created around her.  This idea or thought would satisfy God as a precious gift 
resembling his own creation or, in Traherne’s words, as “an offering returned” (2.90). 
 Traherne’s poem “Dreams,” from Poems of Felicity, sheds more light on 
Traherne’s understanding of the terms “idea” and “thought.”  The main argument of this 
poem is that thoughts are like things because they can have the same potency of 
emotional effect on the subject who entertains them.  This argument arises from 
Traherne’s realization that dreams move him as effectively as if they were waking 
experiences, even though they occur nowhere beyond his mind.  The poem challenges 
distinctions both between sleep and wakefulness, and between thought and matter, 
emphasizing that all human experience can be defined as much by inwardness as by 
outward circumstance.  Traherne does not see this as an epistemological problem, or as 
a source of anxiety, but as an empowering realization of how much he can determine 
the pleasure and suffering of his own life. 
 “Dreams” begins with the speaker in awe of the world he recently encountered 
in his dream.  He is in disbelief that nature, including people and animals, could appear 
as if to his waking senses (PF 115).  The speaker expresses his amazement through the 
inquiring tone of the first three stanzas, all of which end with questions.  In the first two 
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stanzas, Traherne measures the reality of the things in his dreams against his waking 
experiences: 
 The reall Sun, that hev’nly Ey! 
 Can closed Eys ev’n in the darkest Night 
 See throu their lids, & be inform’d with Sight? 
  
The People were to me 
As tru as those by day I see. (Poems 114-5) 
Traherne is fascinated by his realization that an objective reality could easily be 
replaced or supplemented by thought.  The words “reall,” “inform’d” and “tru” which 
Traherne uses to describe his dreams are all words which are associated with the 
certainty of knowledge—something that is not typically associated with dreams.  
Traherne’s tone is inquiring at the beginning of the poem, but he does not express any 
anxiety about his uncertainty in discerning between dream and reality.  This uncertainty 
is, for Traherne, a source of curiosity: “What sacred Secret’s this, / Which seems to 
intimat my Bliss?” (Poems 115).   Traherne’s experience of dreams leads into his 
further investigation of the distinction between thoughts and things. 
 Traherne determines that thoughts are not easy to discern from things because 
they determine the ways in which people experience things.  Much like Sidney argues 
that poetic fiction can “move” the reader more effectively than rhetorical persuasion 
(103), Traherne determines that thoughts move the subject to emotional experiences 
which cannot extend from objects in the world.  Traherne writes: 
 Thought!  Surely Thoughts are tru; 
 They please as much as Things can do: 
 Nay Things are dead, 
 And in themselves are severed 
 From Souls; nor can they fill the Head 
 Without our Thoughts.  Thoughts are the Reall Things 
 From whence all Joy, from whence all Sorrow springs. (Poems 116) 
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Traherne doesn’t measure the truth of thought by its ability to be experienced by more 
than one person or to be physically proven, but by its effect or its ability to move the 
thinking subject to an emotional experience.  Just as Traherne writes in Centuries that 
the world is enjoyed by means of thought (2.90), he writes here that thoughts are a 
necessary medium by which objects are applied to the mind.  Traherne understands 
human conception such that no experience of the world is possible without subjective 
thought, which creates a unique version of the world within each individual. 
 Traherne instructs the reader to move away from her errant perception of the 
world as a prison, to a new vision of the world as paradise by transforming herself and 
her vision through creative writing, thought experiment and other methods of 
manipulating her thoughts and emotions.  The counterfactual phrase, “[w]ere you able 
to create other worlds,” in Meditation 2.90 points to the process by which Traherne 
helps his reader correct her vision of the world.  The reader can only change her vision 
of the world by changing herself and her expectations through experiments with fiction.  
The next section looks at the thought experiments Traherne leads his reader through in 
Centuries in order to make her see the real world differently, as well as a thought 
experiment he constructs in Poems of Felicity which works toward the same goal. 
 
Thought Experiments 
 For Traherne, thought has more authority than things do to generate and 
transform human experience.  Traherne uses thought to create fictions which, unlike the 
prophetically framed Paradise Lost, the reader should experience as such.  By gaining 
new experiences through thought experiment, the reader should become transformed 
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and therefore see the world differently.  She should not only see it differently, but see it 
as paradise because she ought to realize that in spite of the human power to create 
attractive fictions and fantasies in the mind, nothing that the author or reader can create 
surpasses the beauty, completeness and usefulness of God’s creation.  
 Traherne leads his reader through a series of thought experiments at the 
beginning of the “Second Century” with the expressed intention of effecting real change 
in the way the reader sees the outward world.  The lesson Traherne extends to his reader 
is that no matter how much she pursues her desires through her imagination, she will 
always find that God’s world is more worthy of her thoughts.  Traherne ultimately 
directs the reader’s praise back to the outward world, but he emphasizes that creative 
thought and the expression of poetry and fiction are necessary for improving the 
subject’s perception of reality. 
 For example, to teach the reader that the sun in the sky is perfect, Traherne asks 
her to create worlds in her mind in which the sun is either absent or altered.  Traherne 
doesn’t describe the world he wants his reader to imagine in detail, but rather compels 
her to participate by imagining it for herself.  This recalls the invitation at the beginning 
of Centuries for the reader to transform herself by writing in the book as well as reading 
it.  Traherne sees the reader’s creativity as central to fulfilling the book’s purpose.  
Rather than using detailed description in his thought experiments, Traherne uses 
language that makes the reader aware of the interpretive and creative role she plays as 
the author of her own imagination.   
 The first thought experiment is explicitly directed at improving the reader’s 
enjoyment of the world.  The fiction doesn’t replace the world, but effects a real change 
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in the subject’s own experience of the world, helping her enjoy it more.  Traherne 
instructs his reader: “[i]f you desire directions how to enjoy [the world], place yourself 
in it as if no one were created besides yourself, and consider all the services it doth unto 
you alone” (Centuries 2.2).  Traherne doesn’t describe what a newly unpopulated world 
would feel like, or the “services” it might perform, which could refer to anything from 
the abundance of vital resources, to the beauty of natural landscapes.  Rather he 
commands the reader to do this work with the words “place yourself” and “consider.”  
Traherne isn’t as interested in presenting altered versions of the world as he is in 
making the reader be creative and to alter her thoughts in ways that are challenging 
because they require her to negate her preconceptions about the world which she has 
always experienced as a populated place. 
The experiments Traherne creates around the sun follow the same pattern.  
Traherne uses fiction to uncover truths which are otherwise concealed from the human 
mind, which he believes is impaired by the imperfection of fallen existence.  Fiction 
works in the case of the sun to de-familiarize the reader from the world she is 
accustomed to, letting her return to reality with new eyes.  Traherne believes that 
happiness is achieved by changing the self, not by trying to change the world. 
In constructing thought experiments around the sun, Traherne doesn’t illustrate 
what he wants his reader to imagine, but tells her how he wants her to go about 
imagining it for herself.  Traherne commands the reader to undertake her own 
development of an idea, just as he does in the previous experiment with solitude: 
“[s]uppose the sun were absent, and conceive the world to be a dungeon of darkness and 
death about you: you will then find his beams more delightful” (CM 2.7).  The most 
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emphatic words in this passage are not those describing the world or the sun’s beams, 
but the words “suppose,” “conceive” and “find.”  Unlike Milton, Traherne doesn’t paint 
a vivid picture that leads the readers by her senses into another world that is at least 
mostly created for her.  Rather, Traherne wants the reader to perform this creative labor 
herself and to conceive a new world on her own.  These three key words, “suppose,” 
“conceive” and “find” also outline the process of poetic creation which begins with a 
supposition, or what Sidney would call an “Idea or fore-conceit” (101).  Then the poet 
can “conceive” the idea in the detailed development of a fictional world or through 
poetic expression.  Finally the poem leads to a discovery in the real world, or to the 
reader “find[ing]” out a new truth that was previously unknown. 
Traherne continues through the beginning of the “Second Century” in 
developing thought experiments around the sun, shifting from the imperative mood seen 
in the last two examples, to the subjunctive mood.  This mood is like the imperative in 
that its concluding clause enlists the active participation of the reader.  When Traherne 
writes: “[w]ere you able to create worlds” (2.90), he asserts both that the reader cannot 
do so, and that she could fictitiously imagine herself doing so.  Traherne unites content 
to what is happening in the mind of the reader as she reads the text when he uses the 
subjunctive mood to provoke creative thought in the reader.  Whether or not she 
chooses to write her own praise in the book, the reader will become aware of her own 
creative abilities by reading what Traherne writes for her. 
When Traherne employs the subjunctive mood to construct fictional experiences 
of the sun, he prompts the creative participation of the reader in a similar way.  
Traherne writes: “[w]ere there two suns […] they would absume and dry up all the 
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moisture on the earth” (2.10).  Then he writes: “[h]ad the sun been one infinite flame, it 
had been worse than it is” (2.11).  Traherne describes these experimental worlds in 
more conclusive detail, but he begins each description with a counterfactual, spurring 
the creativity of the reader as she constructs the conditions of the imaginary world in 
her own mind. 
Traherne thinks through, along with his reader, each of these hypotheticals and 
deems all of them inferior to the nature of the real sun in the real, outward world.  
Constant daylight would rob people of the “sweetness of Repose” and a larger sun 
would dry up the earth (2.10-11).  Neither the reader’s creations, nor Traherne’s 
creations could ever surpass God’s creations.  In fact, they are not intended to.  
However, these fictional creations do help people surpass their prior understanding of 
the world by helping them enjoy the sun as it is.  Traherne advises his reader: “[l]earn to 
enjoy what you have first, and covet more if you can afterwards” (2.12).  The thought 
experiments around the sun all imagine an augmented or multiplied sun.  This indicates 
that the reader creates fictions because she covets more, but when she discovers through 
a prosthetic experience that she does not really want what she thought she coveted, she 
is able to enjoy what she has.  Traherne doesn’t condemn the reader’s desire, but 
encourages it by telling her to pursue her desire through fiction.  Denise Inge picks up 
on the importance of desire in Traherne’s theology when she writes that for Traherne, 
desire and insatiability are virtues insofar as they are signs of divinity in the human 
mind.  The clearest example of this in Centuries is when Traherne tells his reader: 
“[y]ou must want like a God that you may be satisfied like a God” (1.44).  In the 
passage concluding his series of thought experiments, Traherne tells the reader to covet 
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more “if [she] can” (1.44), challenging her to pursue her desire with more creativity 
rather than warning her against it because he knows that her desire will always be 
dispelled by greater satisfaction with reality.  
Moving from Centuries to Poems, “On Leaping over the Moon” begins with the 
speaker seeing the sun reflected in the water and imagining that another world is below.  
In the first stanza, he links this experience to a story his brother told him about leaping 
over the moon.  The brother wants to leap over the moon in the sky, but chooses not to 
do so with the help of a “feigned horse” (PF 105), like Phaeton, nor to be “deceived by 
Icarian wings” (PF 105).  He will not mimic the classical models which ended in 
disaster, but will surpass them with the power of his wit.  The man chooses to “bold the 
Danger overcome” as he runs and leaps over the reflection, then later tells his brother, 
the poem’s speaker, how he leapt over the moon and gazed down at a distant earth (PF 
106).   
The association of Icarus’ flight to the sun with a flight to the moon seems 
unusual, but it is not unique to Traherne.  Francis Hicks wrote in Certain Select 
Dialogues of Lucian, Together with his True History (1634) of a character named 
Mennipus who outdoes Icarus by successfully flying to the moon (Cressy 966).  This 
appears in the midst of what Cressy dubs England’s “lunar moment,” or a heightened 
interest in moon travel and the possibility of life on the moon (967).  Fictional works 
about moon travel, such as that by Hicks, were criticized by some as “ridiculous” and 
“idle fancies” (Cressy 975).  Traherne’s poem “On Leaping over the Moon” proves that 
fictions of moon travel are not merely “idle fancies,” but creations which carry moral 
lessons that can substantially change people’s lives on earth for the better.  This is much 
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like Sidney’s Apology which, less than a century earlier, defends fiction in general 
against the same kind of criticism. 
Traherne’s leaping man performs poetically, not only because he creates a witty 
idea in his mind, but because he gains a place in the poem by narrating the action of 
leaping as he perceived himself performing it.  Traherne writes that, “as he leapt, with 
Joy related soon / How happy he o’r-leapt the Moon” (PF 106).  The words “related 
soon” are pivotal because the leaping man’s own account determines the poem’s 
portrayal of the event.  Traherne describes the subjective nature of the leaping man’s 
experience when he describes the man’s certainty in his perception of himself: “[a]s 
much as others thought themselves to ly / Beneath the moon, so much more high / He 
thought himself to fly” (PF 106).  The man is just as certain that he flies as anyone else 
is certain that they stand on the earth.  Note that the title of the poem doesn’t describe 
the man’s action objectively or it would be called “On Leaping over a Reflection of the 
Moon.”  Rather, the poem frames the event subjectively, as the leaping man experiences 
it.  Traherne doesn’t see this subjectivity as a problem, but as an opportunity for the 
leaping man to make himself happier through the expression of his own divine nature.  
This poem is more playful than the thought experiments Traherne uses in Centuries, but 
it adopts the same principle, which Traherne takes very seriously, that the pursuit of 
desire through fiction dispels desire by evoking greater clarity of perception and 
satisfaction with the real world, which Traherne believes everyone should enjoy as 
much as they imagine they could enjoy Eden.   
This fantasy of flight doesn’t result in an obsession with pretending to leap over 
the moon, but in a greater reverence for the regular experience of seeing the moon 
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distant in the sky.  The poem ends with the speaker telling of how his brother is 
thereafter enthralled to see that as he goes from town to town, the moon follows to shine 
on him in all places (PF 107).  This satisfaction seems like a great lowering of 
expectations following the man’s previous desire to leap over the moon.  Easy 
contentment suddenly replaces great ambition.  This shows that Traherne doesn’t blame 
imperfection in the world for sparking human dissatisfaction as much as a flaw in 
human estimation of the world.  Extending the joy he shares with his imaginative 
brother, Traherne’s speaker asserts that, “every single Person hath such Store, / ‘Tis 
want of Sense that makes us poor” (PF 108).  What Traherne refers to as “sense” 
ultimately lies in perceiving the world as it exists objectively; however, the poem shows 
that this perception cannot be achieved without prior use of fiction to correct the human 
gaze.  Traherne shows that creating other worlds through thought experiment is not an 
end in itself, but a means by which the reader may better appreciate the world as it 
naturally exists. 
 
Poetry and the Fallen World 
 As previous examples show, Traherne does not use creativity with the goal of 
changing the world, but to transform the reader and her perception of the world.  Above, 
I’ve discussed how Traherne defines intellectual creativity and how he thinks such 
creativity might change peoples’ lives.  This section shows that Traherne believes 
creativity is imperative for the reader because of her fallen condition.  Similarly, Sidney 
believes that the necessity of fiction is proof of the Fall of Mankind because it implies 
that people are not satisfied with the world as it is: “with no small argument to the 
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incredulous of that first accursed fall of Adam: since our erected wit maketh us know 
what perfection is, and yet our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it” (Sidney 
101). Unlike Sidney, however, Traherne believes that perfection is what people find in 
reality after looking through fiction, not something fiction can actually capture. 
The thought experiments discussed in the previous section are one way in which 
Traherne shows the reader that he wants her to transform herself through creative 
thought that transforms the world as she conceives it in her mind.  Another way 
Traherne instructs the reader to transform herself is by telling her to become her own 
mental chemist so she can manipulate and master her thoughts and emotions just as the 
chemist or experimentalist would master the elements and objects of nature.  Traherne 
compares the creative thought of the reader to both the chemical transformation of 
matter and to God’s creation of the world in Genesis: 
This world was far better than Paradise had men eyes to see its glories and their 
advantages.  For the very miseries and sins and offences that are in it are the 
materials of his joy and triumph and glory.  So that he is to learn a diviner art 
that will now be happy, and that is like a royal chemist to reign among poisons, 
to turn scorpions into fishes, weeds into flowers, bruises into ornaments, poisons 
into cordials […] a man must, like a God, bring Light out of Darkness and order 
out of confusion. (CM 4.21)   
 
The simile Traherne employs between chemistry and creative thought compares objects 
to ideas to show that thoughts build experience in the same way that things do, and that 
thoughts are as subject as things are to mastery and manipulation.  To break down the 
correspondences formed through the elongated simile in this passage, note that 
“miseries and sins and offences” are like the weeds, bruises and poisons the chemist 
works with, while “joy and triumph and glory” are like the flowers, ornaments and 
cordials that are the product of the chemist’s transformative work.  Traherne uses 
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material transformation to describe the “diviner art” of mental and spiritual 
transformation that makes the reader’s experience of the world more pleasant and helps 
her see it as it truly is.   
 This passage not only compares the creative reader to the chemist, but it also 
compares her to God by saying that she can improve her experience of the world by 
bringing “Light out of Darkness and order out of confusion” (4.20).  Just like God’s 
directs transformation at the improvement of Chaos, the reader improves herself.  The 
clarity of seeing the world as the paradise that Traherne believes that it truly is, brings 
light and order to the darkness and confusion of perceiving the world as a fallen place of 
“miseries and sins and offences” (4.20).  Sidney connects poetic creation to divine 
creation and Traherne creates a simile to compare the creative thought of every 
individual to divine creation, giving every reader the potential to become a poet.   
 While the transformations described in this passage occur inwardly, they have a 
real impact on the subject’s experience of the outward world.  The inwardness and 
individuality of the transformation Traherne instructs the reader to undergo in this 
passage is balanced by the goal of moving back outward to the “the world” and “its 
glories,” which Traherne believes can and should be perceived in the same way by 
everyone.  The end of the inward creation of “joy and triumph and glory” is to feel joy 
in finally being able to see these positive things present in the outward world of God’s 
creation.   
 Traherne’s insistence here that paradise is in the outward world complicates 
Louis Martz’s reading of Centuries of Meditations as a book which pursues the 
Augustinian vision of inward paradise.  Martz compares Paradise Lost and Centuries of 
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Meditations to the Confessions of Saint Augustine and concludes that “Traherne and 
Milton share the Augustinian vision of a Paradise within” (35).  The process of inward 
illumination and divine revelation that Martz associates with Augustine relates more 
closely to Milton than it does to Traherne.  Traherne does not find paradise in the mind 
or in fictions that extend from the mind, but writes that “this world” could be paradise if 
people would see it correctly.  This is different from Milton, who ends Paradise Lost 
with the consolation of “paradise within” (12.587). 
 Milton believes that the human condition is imperfect on account of the Fall of 
Mankind, but that people can escape this imperfection by creating better worlds through 
fiction.  Sidney also asserts this in the Apology, but rather than paradise, he associates 
poetry with the perfection of Ovid’s “golden world” (100).  This meditation from the 
“Fourth Century” reveals that Traherne sees the world as paradise, but believes that 
people need fiction in order to see it correctly because the Fall of Mankind has clouded 
human judgment.  These poets have different ideas about whether the Fall has more 
negative impact on the world or on the people in it, but they all see fiction as a 
productive response that can improve the human experience.  Traherne affirms that he 
associates the need for fiction with the Fall when he reveals that after death or at the 
time of Final Judgment, people will no longer need to distort their visions of the world 
in order to see it correctly. 
 Traherne writes in the poem “Consummation” that when earth and Heaven trade 
places, people will no longer need to invent things after their desire.  The beginning of 
the poem describes how, in the fallen world, peoples’ thoughts encompass more than 
the material world that they can perceive around them.  Traherne writes: 
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[t]he Thoughts of Men appear  
Freely to mov within a Sphere […]  
The Ground on which they acted be  
Is unobserv’d Infinity. (Poems 126) 
Thoughts contain infinite possibility and are not limited to what people can observe 
around them.  Even though Traherne writes that thoughts move freely, he also notes that 
they are substantial, or real insofar as they are “acted” upon “Ground,” or come to exist 
beyond the mind of the thinking subject as they influence his or her state of being in the 
world.  The infinite extension of human thought in a finite world necessitates creativity: 
 Wherin because we no 
 Object distinctly find or know; 
 We sundry Things invent, 
 That may our Fancy giv content. (Poems 127) 
Traherne writes here that when people desire things they cannot find in the world, they 
can explore these things through inventive thought.  The subject receives contentment 
from the creations of his or her fancy, but this is not the same as the contentment 
Traherne ultimately wants people to find in God’s creations.   
The true contentedness doesn’t come in this poem, however, until people leave 
the temporal world either in death or at the day of Final Judgment.  Traherne believes 
people will no longer find disparity between their thoughts and desires and the things 
they can find in the world around them.  Traherne writes that “at last […] in a glorious 
Day”: 
Nor shall we then invent 
Nor alter Things; but with content 
All in their places see, 
As doth the Glorious Deity. (Poems 128) 
Traherne believes that desire and discontentment are necessary in life on earth, which 
also necessitates invention and alteration, or creativity.  The need for creativity comes 
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from our inability to see and know everything, or “[a]ll in their places see.”  Traherne’s 
approach to creativity is complex because he simultaneously pursues the opposites of 
desire and satisfaction.  This is why Traherne writes in Centuries that “[y]ou must want 
like a God that you may be satisfied like a God” (1.44).  Denise Inge’s reading of 
Traherne’s approach to desire is helpful here: “[desire] is good for two reasons: first, 
because it leads the desiring human to seek and keep on seeking; and second because it 
is a divine quality” (64).  Only rather than “seeking,” it would be appropriate to say that 
desire, for Traherne, leads the human to keep creating and altering things like a God.  
Traherne does not condemn fiction-making and other forms of creativity as signs of 
human dissatisfaction, but he sees creativity as a link that connects desire and 
satisfaction as contrary sides of both the human condition and of the divine condition. 
 Traherne believes that fiction-making is necessary for correcting the desire 
inherent in human vision and allowing people to see and be satisfied with the world as it 
truly is.  Traherne doesn’t believe that people should replace reality with fantasy, but he 
also complicates the distinction between the two because he focuses on an exchange 
between reality and fantasy, or between thoughts and things.  Much like Sidney, 
Traherne shows that fiction becomes reality when it moves or transforms human 
experience.  For Traherne, awareness of the real world as paradise requires creative 
thought and expression because it requires the reader to transform herself, thereby 
transforming her experience of the outer world.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 Sidney, Milton and Traherne would all agree that fiction is a necessary form of 
human thought and expression because it is powerful enough to completely transform 
the human experience by actualizing ideals in a world which is, or at least seems to be, 
imperfect.  However, the different approaches they take to portraying fiction reveal that 
fiction was not always taken seriously, and was sometimes criticized by readers as a 
violation of truth.  Sidney’s Apology and Milton’s Paradise Lost use prophecy as a 
shield for fiction because fiction is vulnerable to attack, especially when it lays claim to 
things people perceive as divine and cosmic truths, as it does in Milton’s epic.  Were the 
speaker of Milton’s epic to present himself as a poet of fiction, his creation of the epic 
would appear to be an imitation of divine creation.  While I have shown that this is what 
the poem does to some extent, the prophetic formula the speaker employs works to 
mask this connection so that the speaker of the poem does not seem, from the way he 
presents himself in the prologues, to imitate God by creating the world of the poem. 
 Traherne embraces fiction more openly than the other two poets and he is 
explicit in telling his reader that she should see herself as godlike in her creativity, 
bringing “Light out of Darkness and order out of confusion” (4.22).  He uses fiction to 
approach the same theological problem of alienation from paradise that Paradise Lost 
engages, but he also shows that manmade fiction does not profane divine truth by 
departing from it.  Sidney and Milton believe that fallen world is imperfect and that 
fiction is a way out of the known world and into another world of greater perfection.  
Traherne, on the other hand, believes that earth is a paradise better than Eden.  For this 
reason, he uses fiction to break through the illusions of the human mind and to enter 
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into the known world with a new perspective.  Traherne establishes harmony between 
truth and fiction because rather than presenting fiction as a way to depart from or 
change the world, he presents it as a way to change people and to help them see the 
world as it truly exists. 
One thing to consider in measuring the different approaches these poets take to 
fiction-making is the kind of audience each poet was considering while writing his 
respective works.  Sidney and Milton were prominent figures who would have expected 
many people with a wide range of opinions to read their texts.  Traherne, on the other 
hand, was writing with a single reader in mind.  This may have allowed him to express 
himself more sincerely, without having to guard himself against popular criticisms of 
fiction.  The marginality of Traherne’s work allows him to utilize and express his belief 
in the usefulness of fiction with great clarity.  In contrast, the popularity of Sidney and 
Milton may have forced them to demonstrate their celebrations of fiction more 
indirectly, in order to deflect some of the criticisms of fiction these poets were sensitive 
to when they wrote their texts. 
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